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1. THE OPINION REPORT
In most international business transactions involving parties from
the United States and foreign countries, legal opinions are requested
from counsel admitted in the country of the foreign party (foreign
counsel). Through these legal opinions, the party in the United States
seeks foreign counsel's professional opinion that the legal assumptions
upon which it is basing its decision on whether or not to proceed with
the transaction are correct. An unqualified favorable opinion constitutes
a statement to the domestic party that foreign counsel has examined
specific legal aspects of the transaction and has found them to be
proper. To the extent foreign counsel is unable to give an unqualified
favorable opinion, the recipient is put on notice that the contemplated
transaction may involve certain legal risks which should be further
evaluated.
Additional problems may arise by obtaining legal opinions of for-
eign counsel. Frequently, the foreign party does not see the purpose for
these opinions. Furthermore, foreign counsel may object to certain legal
conclusions reached in the domestic attorney's opinion draft. Long and
often difficult discussions between domestic and foreign attorneys may
ensue. Counsel in the United States may be unable to understand why
foreign counsel disagrees with seemingly ordinary legal conclusions;
foreign counsel may finally provide the opinion believing that "it does
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not really matter" and that the entire procedure of obtaining legal
opinions of foreign counsel is simply another idiosyncracy of the United
States legal system.
In these negotiations between United States and foreign counsel
over the opinion language, it often appears that the domestic counsel
does not have a very clear understanding of either the meaning of the
opinions sought or the reasons for requesting the opinion. As these ne-
gotiations continue, the client often becomes both irritated about the
time spent by the lawyers discussing "merely legal" issues and possibly
upset if the "opinion negotiations" either lead to an impasse or endan-
ger his transaction. These recurrent experiences led the Committee on
Banking Law of the Section on Business Law of the International Bar
Association to form, in 1984, a Subcommittee on Legal Opinions.1 In
September 1987, the Subcommittee on Legal Opinions published its fi-
nal report (the Report).2
The Report states that it has two principal purposes. The first
purpose of the Report is to improve communication between attorneys
in the United States and those in foreign countries.3 In order to com-
municate rationally in their discussions over the wording of a legal
opinion, attorneys in both countries must have a common understand-
ing of the terminology used in the opinion." Ultimately, they must be
able to agree on an opinion which (i) gives the domestic client adequate
comfort with respect to his legal assumptions and (ii) reflects the
unique aspects of the foreign legal system.5 The second principal pur-
pose of the Report is to analyze the relationship between the opinions
of foreign and domestic counsel.' Where the laws of several countries
apply to a transaction, both the foreign and domestic opinions must be
constructed like pieces of a puzzle before the recipient of the opinion
can be certain that all pertinent legal issues arising under every rele-
vant legal system have been fully addressed.7
The Report uses as its model a legal opinion requested by a major
New York bank from counsel for the borrower, a foreign corporation,
in connection with an unsecured loan agreement for United States dol-
' See M. GRUSON & M. KUTSCHERA, LEGAL OPINIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS: FOREIGN LAWYERS' RESPONSE TO U.S. OPINION REQUESTS 1
(1987) (Report of the Subcomm. on Legal Opinions of the Comm. on Banking Law of
the Sections on Business Law of the Int'l Bar Ass'n) [hereinafter Report].
2 Id.
3 Id. at 7.
4 Id.
SId.
oId.
' Id. at 8.
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lar borrowings governed by New York law. The Report comments on
each item or clause of the opinion. The first part of each comment sets
forth the United States perspective on the portion of the opinion under
discussion and either paraphrases or quotes from the "Tribar Report,"'
which reflects generally accepted views - at least as far as New York
law is concerned - on legal opinions. The second part of each com-
ment summarizes the related viewpoints of attorneys from Argentina, 9
Austria, 0 Canada,"' England, 12  France, 3 Germany,' Italy,' Ja-
pan,"6 The Netherlands,' 7 and Switzerland. 8 These foreign responses
discuss both the validity of the opinion under a particular foreign legal
system and whether or not modifications are advisable. These responses
also address the extent of investigation necessary to enable a lawyer to
render a valid opinion. Finally, where it was necessary to either ex-
plain certain concepts of the Tribar Report or comment on an item or
clause of the opinion from a conflict-of-laws perspective, the authors of
the Report added necessary explanations and comments under the
heading "Reporters' Annotations."' 9
This article identifies and briefly discusses some of the clauses con-
tained in a legal opinion which are particularly relevant in interna-
tional business transactions and which have not been sufficiently ad-
dressed and examined in the past.
2. THE LEGAL OPINION ITSELF: SELECTED ISSUES
2.1. Corporate Status Opinion20
In the United States, an opinion that a corporation has been "duly
incorporated" and "duly organized" means that all steps necessary for
" New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, A Report By the Special Comm. on Legal
Opinions in Commercial Transactions (cooperative effort with the Corporation Law
Comm. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York and the Corporation Law
Comm. of Banking, Corporation and Business Law Section of the New York State Bar
Ass'n), reprinted in Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 Bus. LAW.
1891 (1979) [hereinafter Tribar Report].
' Pedro de Elizalde (Allende & Brea). See Report, supra note 1 at 1 n.1.
10 Michael Binder and Michael Kutschera (Binder, Grbsswang & Partners). See
id.
John W. Teolis (Blake, Cassels & Graydon). See id.
12 Martin Read (Slaughter & May). See id.
13 Francis Meyrier (Shearman & Sterling). See id.
14 Burkhardt Meister (MUller, Weitzel, Weisner). See id.
10 Marcello Gioscia (Ughi & Nunziante). See id.
10 Yusako Ono (Hamada & Matsumoto). See id.
17 Peter Verloop (Nauta van Haersolte). See id.
18 Suzanne Wettenschwiler (Bgr & Karrer). See id.
19 See id. at 19.
20 Id. at 32.
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the creation of the corporation were properly taken under applicable
state law as of the date of incorporation.21 Foreign responses reveal that
any distinction between "duly incorporated" and "duly organized" is
meaningless in most civil law countries.22 An opinion stating that a
corporation is "validly existing" covers the incorporated status of a cor-
poration at a time subsequent to organization.2 3 Typically, a corpora-
tion will cease to validly exist when, for example, it either voluntarily
dissolves or its corporate term of existence expires.2 '
Generally, corporations in a civil law country come into existence
upon registration with a commercial register.25 The incorporation pro-
cess is usually regulated in great detail by corporate law. Furthermore,
a corporation will only be registered after a competent registration
court has examined whether or not all steps required for incorporation,
including its "due organization," have been taken.26 In many foreign
jurisdictions, therefore, commercial registers must be both examined in
order to give a proper corporate status opinion and added to the list of
examined documents. In some countries, rendering an opinion regard-
ing the due incorporation, due organization and valid existence of a
corporation also requires an inspection of the commercial register files
(which contain the submitted documents in full). In other countries,
obtaining a so-called "excerpt" from the commercial register is suffi-
cient to render a corporate status opinion. The detailed foreign reac-
tions in the Report should make attorneys in the United States aware
of both the scope of investigation required in each participating country
and the extent to which reliance on the commercial register is protected
by law.27
The Report also points out that the existence of a corporation in
many foreign countries does not depend on the payment of a franchise
or taxes.2' Therefore, the opinion that a corporation is "in good stand-
ing" is meaningless in most civil law countries.29
21 Id. at 32.
22 Id. at 33-38.
22 Id. at 39.
24 Id.
25 For a discussion of relevant German law, see A. BAUMBACH & A. HUECK,
GMBH-GEsETz, § 10, annot. 4 (14th ed. 1985).
28 Id. § 9(c), annot. 3.
27 Report, supra note 1, at 39-45.
28 Id. at 46.
29 Id.
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2.2. Corporate Action Opinion"0
If used in connection with a United States corporation, the phrase
"authorized by all necessary corporate action" typically refers to an act
which is authorized by the board of directors or by the shareholders of
the corporation."' The foreign reactions in the Report suggest that
there are legal systems in which the actions of certain corporate officers
create legal, valid and binding obligations to third parties, without re-
gard to authorization by either the entire board of directors or the
shareholders of the corporation.32 In these legal systems, the power to
represent and bind a corporation is vested in certain legally appointed
officers as a matter of law and does not depend on any kind of separate
authorization."3 In this context, the opinion that "the execution, deliv-
ery and performance by [party] of the Agreement have been duly au-
thorized by all necessary corporate action" is inappropriate; " the Re-
port proposes the following opinion:
The. . . Agreement. . . ha[s] been duly executed and
delivered for and on behalf of [party] by , .
duly authorized for such purposes by [party]. No further au-
thorization by any corporate action of [party] is required in
connection with the execution, delivery and performance of
the . . . Agreement .... 5
In the more complex situation where a person signed the agree-
ment on the basis of a power of attorney, the opinion should also cover
due authorization, execution and delivery of the power of attorney. In
many civil law countries, the power of attorney, if executed and deliv-
ered by certain corporate officers, may similarly create legal, valid and
binding obligations which require no separate corporate.
authorization."6
2.3. Execution and Delivery Opinion
37
2.3.1. Legal Authority
The opinion that an agreement has been duly executed and deliv-
ered by a party assures its recipient that there was a manifestation of
30 Id.
31 Id. at 53.
32 Id.
s3 Id. at 47.
34 Id. at 53.
:5 Id. at 54.
6 Id. at 54, 58.
37 Id. at 56.
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intent to create a legal, valid and binding agreement (which may be
required by either applicable law or the agreement in question)., In
the case of a corporation, this intent can be exercised only by officers,
persons holding a power of attorney or persons specifically authorized
by the corporation to perform certain binding acts. 9 Therefore, the due
execution and delivery opinion must also address the authority of the
person in question to act on behalf of and to bind the corporation with
respect to third parties. 0
The legal authority of the person acting on behalf of a corporation
in the execution and delivery of an agreement is usually determined by
the law of the country of incorporation.4' It is less clear which law
determines whether the required manifestation of intent to create a le-
gal, valid and binding agreement was present.42 In making this deter-
mination, the conflict-of-laws rules of the foreign counsel's nation may
look to either the law governing the agreement, the law of the place in
which the agreement was signed, the law of the country where the cor-
poration on whose behalf such person acted in the execution and deliv-
ery of the agreement was incorporated, or, possibly, some other nation's
law.43 The Report suggests that, if the law which decides whether the
required manifestation of intent was present cannot be determined with
complete certainty, foreign and domestic counsel should both give opin-
ions on due execution and delivery under the laws of their respective
forums.44 Domestic attorneys would have to either assume or rely on
foreign counsel's opinion that the persons executing and delivering the
agreement are authorized both to act on behalf of the corporation and
to bind it in its actions. Since the signing of the agreement and the
closing of the transaction will most likely take place in either the coun-
try of foreign counsel or the state of domestic counsel, one of the two
opinions will also cover the law of the place of signing.
The terms "execution" and "delivery" are terms of New York
law;4 5 however, even under New York law, their meaning and relation-
ship to each other are not entirely clear.46 The Report states that if
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agreements - New York's
Approach, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 366 n.120 (1979).
42 Report, supra note 1, at 56.
4S Id.
44 Id.
45 In re Ayer's Trust, 25 Misc. 2d 644, 646-47, 204 N.Y.S.2d 683, 686 (Sup. Ct.
1960) (defining "executed" under New York law); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 1-201(44)
(McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1988) (defining "delivery" under New York law).
4' Report, supra note 1, at 57.
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these terms are used in foreign counsel's opinion, they may not be cor-
rect expressions of that foreign law.47 Nevertheless, the Report suggests
that separate opinions on the due execution and delivery, which accord
with the legal terminology of a foreign country's law, should not be
substituted for the traditional opinion.48 The international legal com-
munity would probably be unwilling to accept a practice of requiring
separate legal opinions of due execution and delivery for each country
involved in an international transaction.
2.3.2. Assumptions
If the foreign counsel is not present at either the signing of the
agreement or the closing of the transaction, an opinion on due execu-
tion and delivery cannot be provided. In that case, the foreign counsel's
opinion would be limited to addressing the authority of certain officers
to execute and deliver the agreement. Furthermore, where an opinion
properly states that no authorization is required for a corporation to be
bound by its officers' action, foreign counsel will also have to make
assumptions with respect to execution and delivery by certain corporate
officers.' The Report proposes the following opinion:
Mr. , a [name of the office of
the person who will sign], [is] duly authorized by [party] to
execute and deliver the . . . Agreement . . . for and on be-
half of [party]. [Assuming the . . . Agreement . . . ha[s]
been duly executed and delivered for and on behalf of [party]
by Mr. , no further authorization by any corpo-
rate action of [party] is required in connection with the exe-
cution, delivery and performance of the Agreement] . . .
This opinion only assumes the presence of a required manifesta-
tion of intent; it does not cover the authority of the person executing
and delivering the agreement to act on behalf of and to bind the party.
The recipient of the opinion will eventually insist that one lawyer state
an opinion concerning the validity of the due execution and delivery by
the person signing the agreement. This lawyer may have to either as-
sume that the person executing and delivering the agreement is author-
ized to act on behalf of the corporation or rely on another opinion re-
garding that authority. 1
47 Id.
49 Id.
49 Id. at 57-58.
60 Id. at 57.
51 Id.
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2.4. Remedies Opinion52
2.4.1. Expression of Purpose
Traditionally, New York lawyers seeking an opinion from foreign
counsel on an agreement governed by New York law requested a state-
ment that the agreement was "legal, valid, binding and enforceable in
accordance with its terms."' 53 This statement is the heart of a customary
legal opinion in the United States. The Report reaches the conclusion
that a lawyer should not state in an opinion that an agreement, which
is governed by a law other than his own, is legal, valid, binding and
enforceable."' The Report recommends a different formulation which
more accurately reflects the scope of the Remedies Opinion.55
The Tribar Report has pointed out that the "legal, valid, binding
and enforceable" opinion assures its recipient that the court will pro-
vide some remedy to an aggrieved party if a suit is brought and certain
other prerequisites are satisfied.56 In most cases, the lawyer predicts
whether or not a court will uphold an agreement governed by the law
of that court's jurisdiction. By contrast, in the context of international
transactions, enforcement of an agreement may be sought in forums
other than the country named in the governing-law clause.
If read together with the usual qualification that an opinion can
only be rendered with respect to a familiar body of law, foreign coun-
sel's opinion that a New York agreement is "legal, valid, binding and
enforceable" only states that the governing-law clause in the agreement
is valid and effective. 57 In nations other than the country of the gov-
erning law, this is the only question which a court will determine
under its own law; if the court finds that the governing-law clause is
valid and effective under the conflict-of-laws rules of its forum, the
court will then continue to apply the law of the stipulated nation. The
Report proposes that attorneys use an opinion that clearly expresses
what the opinion should say rather than continue drafting complicated
opinions which far exceed their proper scope.58
52 For a more detailed discussion of the issues raised in the following text, see
Gruson and Kutschera, Opinion of Counsel on Agreements Governed by Foreign Law,
19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515 (1986); Report, supra note 1, at 62-73.
53 Report, supra note 1, at 59.
5 Id. at 64-65.
55 Id. at 65-72.
51 Id. at 62.
:7 Id. at 64-65.
8 Id.
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2.4.2. Conflict-of-Laws Basis
The principal purpose of foreign counsel's opinion is to address
the issue of whether the courts in the foreign lawyer's country will both
recognize the parties' stipulated choice of law and treat the agreement
in a manner similar to a court within the jurisdiction of the governing
law. A resolution of this issue depends on the validity of a party's
choice of law under the conflict-of-laws rules which govern in foreign
counsel's country. Because these rules differ with every nation, it can be
assumed that the answer depends on which country's law is examined.
The statements of foreign attorneys in the Report reveal, however, that
most countries apply a two-step test in determining the validity of a
contractual choice of law: first, they determine whether the choice of
law in the agreement is generally recognized, and second, they deter-
mine whether there are limitations to the application of that chosen
law. 9 The Report suggests the following model for opinions on an
agreement governed by a law other than that of foreign counsel:
(i) The governing-law clause[], subjecting the . . . Agree-
ment. . . to New York law, [is] valid under the law of the
[foreign lawyer's] country. 0
(ii) Under the law of the [foreign lawyer's] country, New
York law will be applied to an agreement . . . such as the
. . . Agreement . . . which under the law of the [foreign
lawyer's] country has been validly subjected to New York
law, except to the extent that any term of such Agreement or
any provision of law applicable to such Agreement violates
an important public policy of the [foreign lawyer's
country]. 61
(iii) None of the terms of the . . . Agreement . . . violates
an important public policy of the [foreign lawyer's]
country.62
Opinion (i) addresses the issue of whether a choice of law is gener-
ally valid under the laws of foreign counsel's country."3 Opinion (ii)
:9 Id. at 66-69.
60 Id. at 14.
61 Id.
2 Id.
" The question of whether the governing-law clause is generally recognized must
be distinguished from the question of whether the clause constitutes a valid agreement
of the parties. The first question is one concerning conflict-of-laws; the second one
concerns contract law. Foreign counsel's opinion cannot address the question of the
contractual validity of the governing-law clause if, under the conflict-of-laws rules of
foreign counsel's country, the validity of that clause must be determined according to
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looks to the scope and effect of the chosen law under the laws of foreign
counsel's country"4 and reviews any limitations on the application of an
otherwise validly chosen law."5 Opinion clause (ii) asks for a restate-
ment of those laws which may limit the use of an otherwise validly
chosen law in an agreement.66 Under New York law, for instance, ap-
plication of a party's chosen law is limited if either a term of the agree-
ment or a provision of the stipulated law violates an "important public
policy" of New York. 7 Similarly, the conflict-of-laws rules of other
states or countries may have different limitations and will, therefore,
require appropriate variations in the opinion clause (ii). 8 Opinion
clause (iii) analyzes the extent to which a court in foreign counsel's
country will apply a rule mentioned in opinion clause (ii) to limit the
application of the law governing the agreement.69 The content of opin-
ion clause (iii), therefore, will be defined by the limitations on gov-
erning law imposed by opinion clause (ii). Opinion clause (iii), as
drafted above, is based on the assumption that this limitation is not
present. Of course, if this assumption is incorrect, opinion clause (iii)
must be rephrased. If it is not possible to clearly state that a governing-
law clause is limited by a law of foreign counsel's country (it may be
difficult to determine whether a term of the agreement violates a public
policy or similar principle of foreign counsel's country), foreign counsel
may simply state that a provision in the agreement "may violate" a
public policy or similar limitation of the law of foreign counsel's na-
tion.70 In most cases, however, foreign counsel will be able to provide a
the chosen law.
" Report, supra note 1, at 14.
65 Id. at 63.
66 Id.
67 Id.
8 For example, under Austrian law, the application of an otherwise validly stipu-
lated law to an agreement is limited if the application of a term of the agreement or a
provision of the stipulated law is "irreconcilable with the basic principles of Austrian
law." Act of June 15, 1978, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] (federal statute on conflict-of-
laws rules) 304, § 6. See generally Report, supra note 1, at 66-69 (authors presenting
views of several foreign lawyers on specific legal opinions).
69 Report, supra note 1, at 63.
'0 Id. at 64. For example, if a New York lawyer is foreign counsel in connection
with an agreement governed by foreign law which contains a provision for compound
interest, the question arises whether he should take an exception to opinion (iii). New
York courts have held that a provision for compound interest will not be enforced on
the grounds that it is contrary to New York public policy. In re Am. Fuel & Power
Co., 151 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1945); Young v. Hill, 67 N.Y. 162 (1876); Giventer v.
Arnow, 44 A.D.2d 160, 354 N.Y.S.2d 162 (App. Div. 1974). It is not clear, however,
whether a provision for compound interest violates an important public policy - the
standard applied by the conflict-of-laws rules of New York. New York counsel render-
ing an opinion on an agreement which is governed by foreign law and contains a provi-
sion for compound interest may therefore want to limit opinion (iii) by adding the
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definite answer. Public policy, as a general legal principle, may be an
elusive concept under the law of some nations. Nevertheless, a lawyer
should be able to determine whether a specific provision in a commer-
cial agreement violates public policy. This result follows from the fact
that, in most jurisdictions, there are only a few cases in which a court
has held that certain terms of commercial agreements violated public
policy. Although foreign counsel frequently may either hesitate in pro-
viding the public policy opinion or wish to qualify it by a "to the best
of one's knowledge" clause, the opinion recipient will insist on the in-
sertion of this clause. It is crucial for domestic counsel to know whether
or not certain terms of the agreement can be enforced in the courts of
foreign counsel's country. In addition, concepts such as "public policy"
in a conflict-of-laws analysis are legal concepts and are, therefore, sub-
ject to legal analysis by a lawyer.
2.4.3. Three Unavoidable Gaps
The Report identifies certain gaps in the Remedies Opinion which
cannot be closed.7" The formulations of opinions suggested by the Re-
port, however, focus attention on those gaps and alert its reader to the
limited scope of the opinion. If the traditional Remedies Opinion sug-
gested by the Tribar Report were used for international transactions,
the existence of these gaps would remain hidden and unclear. 2
Any choice of law incorporates portions of the chosen law into the
agreement. At the same time, either an express term of the agreement
or a provision of the chosen law may violate an important public policy
or similar concept of the law of the foreign counsel's nation. Foreign
counsel, however, often does not fully understand the substantive law
which may apply to an agreement by virtue of the governing-law
clause. In order to confidently state that the chosen law does not violate
a public policy of foreign counsel's nation, knowledge of the laws of
both foreign counsel's nation and the country chosen in the governing-
law clause would be required. Therefore, assuming that foreign counsel
has no expertise in the governing law, any opinion which foreign coun-
sel provides on the application of the governing law must be limited to
the agreement's stated terms and cannot refer to the substantive law
incorporated into the agreement through the governing-law clause. The
Report notes that, although the practical implications of this problem
exception "except to the extent that Section __ of the agreement (providing for the
payment of interest on interest) may violate an important public policy of the State of
New York."
71 Report, supra note 1, at 64-65.
72 Id.
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are small, this gap between the different laws does exist and cannot be
closed.7 The risk it creates must be assumed by the person who ulti-
mately relies on the opinion of foreign counsel.
There is, moreover, a second gap. Because the applicable law both
determines the meaning of the provisions of an agreement and is incor-
porated into an agreement by virtue of the governing-law clause, an
agreement can only be fully understood if it is read with a knowledge
of the law governing that agreement. Foreign counsel, however, is usu-
ally unfamiliar with this body of law. In the case of opinions rendered
in interstate transactions within the United States, it has been suggested
that counsel from one state should assume, for purposes of rendering an
opinion, that the agreement in question is governed by the law of coun-
sel's forum, rather than the law of the governing state. While this ap-
proach may not highlight violations of public policy within the state of
the attorney rendering the opinion, it may nonetheless have some merit
where the two states have substantially similar legal systems. By con-
trast, legal differences between nations make it ludicrous to suggest that
a foreign lawyer read an agreement drafted under New York law as if
it were governed by the law of foreign counsel's nation. With interna-
tional legal opinions, all one can reasonably expect is that foreign coun-
sel be both familiar with the English language and American legal ter-
minology and experienced in international transactions similar to the
transaction reflected in the agreement.
Finally, there is a third gap. Under the conflict-of-laws rules of
certain countries, the effect of the governing-law clause may be limited
by the law of a third country. Under German law, a governing-law
clause will not be applied to an agreement if all elements of the trans-
action were connected to only one country and if there are mandatory
provisions of the law of that country which apply to the transaction.7 '
Under the law of The Netherlands, a law other than that which gov-
erns the agreement will be applied if the application of that law is of
such fundamental importance that it should prevail over the law chosen
by the parties." Foreign counsel should not be expected to know the
laws of third countries and, therefore, cannot opine on whether or not
those laws will override the chosen governing law. Thus, any opinion
which foreign counsel gives on the application of the governing law
does not necessarily ensure that the law of a third country will not
prevail over the governing law under the choice-of-law rules of foreign
counsel's country. The person relying on the opinion of foreign counsel
7S Id.
74 Id.
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
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can, of course, lessen this risk by obtaining additional opinions from
lawyers practicing in the other relevant third countries.
2.4.4. Remedy in Foreign Counsel's Country
An opinion of foreign counsel stating, to the extent possible, that
the contractual choice of law will be recognized by the courts in foreign
counsel's country does not assure the recipient of the opinion that these
courts will also enforce the agreement. An opinion recipient, however,
generally expects an express statement by foreign counsel that the
courts in foreign counsel's country will give "some remedy" in a suit
based on a breach of the agreement.
The meaning and scope of the word "enforceable" is not entirely
clear.78 Therefore, in order to avoid asking foreign counsel to give an
opinion of questionable meaning, the Report spells out in greater detail
both the assumptions underlying and the limitations inherent in that
opinion. 7 The Report suggests the following opinion:
(iv) Assuming that the. . . Agreement [is] legal, valid, bind-
ing, and enforceable under New York law, the . . . Agree-
ment [is] enforceable in accordance with [its] terms, the civil
procedure rules of the [foreign counsel's country] and, subject
to the opinions set forth in clauses . . . (i) through (iii) of
the Opinion, the applicable provisions of the chosen law of
• . . the Agreement [except that the enforceability of the
• . . Agreement] may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency,
reorganization, moratorium or similar laws affecting the en-
forcement of creditors' rights generally. 8
To the extent that other conditions affecting the enforcement of the
agreement by a court in foreign counsel's country (such as government
approvals) may exist, foreign counsel must further qualify the opinion.
Foreign counsel does not have to qualify opinion (iv) with respect
to equitable principles of fairness and good faith. The dichotomy be-
tween courts of equity and courts of law is unknown in most civil law
systems and, therefore, the term "equity" is often translated literally
and incorrectly. The Report points out that confusion is exacerbated by
the fact that some civil law countries equate a translation of "equity"
with concepts related to a duty of good faith. 9 If equitable principles
are embodied in procedural rules of a foreign law, they are covered by
7 Report, supra note 1, at 14.
7 Id. at 69-70.
78 Id. at 14-15.
79 Id. at 71.
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the language in opinion (iv). By contrast, if they constitute substantive
rules under the foreign law, a court in foreign counsel's country will
generally not apply them because the court will defer to the substantive
law chosen in the governing-law clause unless it is limited by a public
policy or similar concept in that country. As noted earlier, a limitation
on either a provision of the agreement or a rule of the governing law
should be noted in opinion (iii)."°
2.5. Jurisdiction Clause
In certain instances, a separate opinion on the availability of per-
sonal jurisdiction over a party may be appropriate. The Report identi-
fies three alternatives which should be considered: (1) that the agree-
ment provide for exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction in foreign
counsel's country; (2) that the agreement either have a no forum-selec-
tion clause or provide for the non-exclusive jurisdiction of a court other
than one in foreign counsel's country; or (3) that the agreement provide
for the exclusive jurisdiction of a court other than one in foreign coun-
sel's country.8" With the first two alternatives, it would be appropriate
to obtain an opinion of foreign counsel as to the availability of personal
jurisdiction, based either on a contractual provision or on the laws of
foreign counsel's nation. 2 In the third alternative, the opinion of for-
eign counsel assures its recipient that the courts in the foreign country
would permit the exclusion ("ouster") of their jurisdiction by the agree-
ment between the parties. Furthermore, if jurisdiction of the foreign
courts were removed, the questions of which law would apply and
whether the agreement would be enforceable in the foreign courts is
relevant only in the most unusual circumstances such as those presented
in bankruptcy.
2.6. Pari Passu Opinion
The pari passu opinion was discussed at the London conference of
the International Bar Association in September 1987.83 A typical pari
80 See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
a Report, supra note 1, at 71-72.
82 Id. The opinion may have to be phrased differently and the legality, validity
and binding nature of the agreement under the governing law may have to be assumed
if, according to the conflict-of-laws rules of the foreign counsel's country, the governing
law and not the lexfori determines the validity of a forum-selection clause.
11 A paper on the pari passu clause was presented by Stephan Hutter at the 1987
London meeting of the Subcommittee on Legal Opinions of the Committee E on Bank-
ing Law of the Section on Business Law of the International Bar Association. S. Hut-
ter, The Pari Passu Clause (Feb. 23, 1988) (unpublished memorandum prepared in
connection with the Meeting on September 16, 1987, of the Subcommittee on Legal
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passu clause might read as follows:
The obligations of [party] under the Agreement rank at
least pari passu in priority of payment and in all other re-
spects with all other [unsecured] obligations of [party]
84
The pari passu opinion states that, subject to limited exceptions,
certain specified obligations of a party rank equally with all of its other
obligations. An exception that is almost always made is that the stated
obligations of a party do not rank equally with its secured obligations,
whether consensual or statutory. This exception arises from the fact
that it is generally understood that a security interest gives its creditor
priority over the rights of unsecured creditors in the same collateral.
Furthermore, foreign reactions in the Report note that foreign laws fre-
quently give certain groups of either creditors (e.g., depositors) or
claims (e.g., those asserted by the government) preference without es-
tablishing a security interest in a technical sense.85 Priorities are also
created among creditors in situations of insolvency and liquidation
which do not involve the formal institution of either bankruptcy or re-
organization proceedings. Two examples of this latter situation are cus-
tomer claims under the Securities Investor Protection Act88 and the use
of funds of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. In this
case, it cannot be said that general creditors are treated pari passu with
these preferred unsecured creditors. Of course, it is impractical in most
cases to list every preferred claim which is an exception to the pari
passu opinion. In many cases, it is suggested that the opinion recipient
recognize that preferred claims may exist and that a general exception
should be read into the pari passu opinion. There are, of course, trans-
actions in which it is very important for the opinion recipient to ascer-
tain the exact character of any preferred claims. For instance, if a bank
borrows money, the lender is interested in knowing whether bank de-
Opinions of the Committee E on Banking Laws of the Section on Business Law of the
International Bar Association) (manuscript available upon request) [hereinafter
Hutter].
84 Id. at 18.
8 Foreign reactions in the Report show that, although foreign counsel recognizes
the problems of contractual or statutory preferences in connection with the pari passu
clause, foreign counsel frequently thinks that these qualifications and limitations are
implicitly included in the word "secured." Technically, this is not correct. It is impor-
tant that opining counsel state the applicable qualifications and limitations to the pari
passu clause expressly in order to alert the opinion recipient to the actual scope and
limits of the opinion.
86 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1982).
87 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (1982). The Securities Investor Protection Corporation
was created by the Securities Investor Protection Act. Id.
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positors enjoy a statutory preference. In appropriate cases, therefore,
the opinion should point out which creditors or claims are preferred by
statute.
If an exception is taken for both secured and preferred claims, the
remaining scope of the pari passu opinion is very limited. The opinion
expresses two ideas: (i) neither the agreement in question nor any col-
lateral agreement between the same parties contractually subordinates a
party's claim covered by the opinion, and (ii) under the foreign law, no
creditor can be given a preferred claim over another creditor without
the subordinated creditor's consent. It is curious that the pari passu
opinion is usually not qualified by a bankruptcy exception. By compar-
ison, the Remedies Opinion is nearly always qualified by a statement
that enforceability is subject to limitations of bankruptcy, insolvency or
other laws affecting the general enforcement of the creditors' rights.88
The Tribar Report indicates that 'a bankruptcy exception should be
read into the pari passu opinion if it is not specifically mentioned.8"
Because the issue of ranking obligations becomes relevant only in en-
forcing them, the pari passu opinion is closely related to the enforce-
ability opinion. Foreign reactions in the Report reveal that foreign
counsel, in giving a pari passu opinion, do not think that they are also
giving an opinion on bankruptcy preferences. Therefore, it is suggested
that the pari passu opinion contain a general bankruptcy exception un-
less foreign counsel is specifically requested to render an opinion on the
ranking of obligations in the event of bankruptcy. The following lan-
guage is suggested:
The obligations of [party] under the Agreement rank at
least pari passu in priority of payment and in all other re-
spects with all other obligations of [party] which are not se-
cured and which have not been accorded by law preferential
rights, subject to the effect of applicable bankruptcy, insol-
vency, reorganization, moratorium, liquidation or similar
laws relating to, or affecting generally the enforcement of
creditors' rights and remedies against [party].9"
3. OUTLOOK
The continuing efforts of the Subcommittee on Legal Opinions of
88 See Report, supra note 1, at 61.
89 Id. at 60-61. The Tribar Report states, however, that it is preferable to include
a bankruptcy exception in the Remedies Opinion because, in general, opinions do not
assume that the addressee is aware of federal or state laws.
" Hutter, supra note 83, at 18.
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the International Bar Association have been widely acclaimed by the
legal profession. A supplement to the Report presently in preparation
will contain additional foreign reactions from representatives of Austra-
lia,91 Brazil,92 Denmark,9 Finland,9' and Spain. 5 It will also contain
a summary of the topics presented at the 1987 London meeting. In
particular, these topics will" include the pari passu opinion and a fur-
ther investigation of the public policy limitations to governing-law
clauses. Finally, the supplement to the Report will contain new issues
to be presented at the 1988 Buenos Aires meeting.
So far the Subcommittee has limited its efforts to legal opinions
typically requested in international lending transactions. It plans, how-
ever, to expand its investigation to opinions requested in corporate ac-
quisitions and securities transactions.
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